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10761f52b2
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AUTH.3E: Executor Command Channel + Runtime Boundary Contract
- job_schema: geschlossene Job-Type-Allowlist (C5_SAVE_OBJECT/C5_DELETE_OBJECT), Pfad-/Längen-Validierung
- job_state_machine: deterministische States (CREATED/READY/CLAIMED/EXECUTING/SUCCEEDED/FAILED)
- job_claim: atomare Claim-/Lease-/Recovery-Logik (kein TOCTOU)
- job_store: getrennte SQLite-Inbox-DBs (c5a_save.db/c5a_delete.db), delegiert an job_claim
- save_executor_core: SAVE-only, Content-Rekonstruktion, Provenance-Validierung
- delete_executor_core: DELETE-only, AUTH.3D-Composition, TOCTOU-Defense (Re-Read nach Claim)
- test_job_channel: T1-T40 + adversarial (72 Tests)
- test_job_channel_adversarial: adversarial + Substitution + DB-Manipulation
- sensitivity_proof_auth3e: Mutationen A-L (12/12 Invarianten PRESENT)
- AUTH3B/3C/3D/3E_DESIGN: autoritative Security-Dokumentation (e25 Reconciliation)
COMMAND != AUTHORIZATION. Kein generischer Dispatcher. RQ credential-free.
Keine produktive Mutation. Keine echten Credentials.
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2026-08-27 10:03:32 +00:00 |
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a11c1bbe53
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AUTH.3A: C5 Caller Auth Integration (SAVE/DELETE Credential, fail-closed, Tests, Sensitivity, Gap-Doku)
- rq_c5c.py: TolariaClient save_token/delete_token DI, _require_token fail-closed,
write()/delete() senden Bearer (SAVE/DELETE), read()/list() ohne Credential
- rq_c5_cli.py: _delete_executor liest nur DELETE-Credential (Least Privilege)
- test_c5c.py: write()-Tests injizieren synthetisches SAVE-Token
- test_c5_auth3a.py: isolierte AUTH.3A-Testsuite (19 Tests, Fake/Mock Tolaria)
- auth3a-sensitivity.sh: 8 Sensitivitaets-Mutationen (A-H) -> ROT
- AUTH3A_HUMAN_APPROVAL_AUTHENTICITY_GAP.md: Gap dokumentiert (OPEN, nicht repariert)
Keine echten Tokens. Keine ENV-Mutation. Kein Deployment. Keine produktive Auth-Aktivierung.
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2026-08-27 08:42:26 +00:00 |
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40bbc40a49
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PRE_HERMES_SECURITY_GATE AUTH.1: Tolaria Write Auth Contract + isolierte Test-Suite
- Contract (ADR): Auth-Modell (SAVE/DELETE-Scope getrennt), Credential-Modell
(RQ/Hermes NO SAVE/DELETE; C5C Writer SAVE only; DeleteExecutor DELETE only),
FAIL-CLOSED-Regeln, Human-DELETE-Gate (2 unabhaengige Ebenen AUTH+APPROVAL),
Logging/Secret-Regeln, Rotation/Revocation, Path-Safety-Contract (Defense-in-Depth).
- Isolierte Test-Suite (47 Tests): T1-T20 Auth-Matrix, Human-Approval-Composition A-G,
Adversarial, Sensitivitaet (Mutationen -> ROT). KEIN Produktionscode geaendert.
- KEINE produktive Mutation, KEINE echten Tokens, nur synthetische Fixture-Werte.
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2026-08-27 05:57:22 +00:00 |
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