Rain Ocampo
|
9c2d6e365a
|
AUTH.4D: DELETE-scoped executor + delete_request_id binding in SoT core
- delete_worker.py: DELETE-scoped worker loop (ApprovalStateStore, fail-closed)
- delete_tolaria_client.py: DELETE-only Tolaria client (fixed /delete endpoint)
- delete_entrypoint.py: DELETE runtime entrypoint (health/status + worker)
- delete_Dockerfile: DELETE executor image (no SAVE code, no credentials)
- delete_executor_core.py: minimal SoT patch — VALID_NONCE replay guard +
VALID_DELETE_REQUEST binding (approval binds delete_request_id, fail-closed
APPROVAL_MISMATCH). Closes P10/T29 security gap in productive SoT.
AUTH.4D P14. No deployment, no token injection, no key provisioning.
|
2026-08-28 02:28:48 +00:00 |
|
|
|
373425fc0d
|
AUTH.3E: Audit-Trail trennt REQUESTED/AUTHORIZED/EXECUTED (Fresh Checker Punkt 27)
Fresh Checker identifizierte Defekt: audit_trail() lieferte nur einen Job-Snapshot,
kein persistentes Audit-Event-Log. Design §18 verlangt Trennung der Phasen.
- job_store: audit_events-Tabelle + _record_audit/record_audit_event; REQUESTED bei create_job
- delete_executor_core: AUTHORIZED nach AUTH.3D-Validierung, EXECUTED nach Mutation
- save_executor_core: AUTHORIZED nach Provenance-Validierung, EXECUTED nach Mutation
- test_job_channel: +4 AuditTrailTests (REQUESTED/AUTHORIZED/EXECUTED)
REPAIR_CYCLES=1. Volle Regression 444 PASS (76+50+19+299).
|
2026-08-27 10:09:18 +00:00 |
|
|
|
10761f52b2
|
AUTH.3E: Executor Command Channel + Runtime Boundary Contract
- job_schema: geschlossene Job-Type-Allowlist (C5_SAVE_OBJECT/C5_DELETE_OBJECT), Pfad-/Längen-Validierung
- job_state_machine: deterministische States (CREATED/READY/CLAIMED/EXECUTING/SUCCEEDED/FAILED)
- job_claim: atomare Claim-/Lease-/Recovery-Logik (kein TOCTOU)
- job_store: getrennte SQLite-Inbox-DBs (c5a_save.db/c5a_delete.db), delegiert an job_claim
- save_executor_core: SAVE-only, Content-Rekonstruktion, Provenance-Validierung
- delete_executor_core: DELETE-only, AUTH.3D-Composition, TOCTOU-Defense (Re-Read nach Claim)
- test_job_channel: T1-T40 + adversarial (72 Tests)
- test_job_channel_adversarial: adversarial + Substitution + DB-Manipulation
- sensitivity_proof_auth3e: Mutationen A-L (12/12 Invarianten PRESENT)
- AUTH3B/3C/3D/3E_DESIGN: autoritative Security-Dokumentation (e25 Reconciliation)
COMMAND != AUTHORIZATION. Kein generischer Dispatcher. RQ credential-free.
Keine produktive Mutation. Keine echten Credentials.
|
2026-08-27 10:03:32 +00:00 |
|
