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a11c1bbe53
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AUTH.3A: C5 Caller Auth Integration (SAVE/DELETE Credential, fail-closed, Tests, Sensitivity, Gap-Doku)
- rq_c5c.py: TolariaClient save_token/delete_token DI, _require_token fail-closed,
write()/delete() senden Bearer (SAVE/DELETE), read()/list() ohne Credential
- rq_c5_cli.py: _delete_executor liest nur DELETE-Credential (Least Privilege)
- test_c5c.py: write()-Tests injizieren synthetisches SAVE-Token
- test_c5_auth3a.py: isolierte AUTH.3A-Testsuite (19 Tests, Fake/Mock Tolaria)
- auth3a-sensitivity.sh: 8 Sensitivitaets-Mutationen (A-H) -> ROT
- AUTH3A_HUMAN_APPROVAL_AUTHENTICITY_GAP.md: Gap dokumentiert (OPEN, nicht repariert)
Keine echten Tokens. Keine ENV-Mutation. Kein Deployment. Keine produktive Auth-Aktivierung.
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2026-08-27 08:42:26 +00:00 |
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40bbc40a49
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PRE_HERMES_SECURITY_GATE AUTH.1: Tolaria Write Auth Contract + isolierte Test-Suite
- Contract (ADR): Auth-Modell (SAVE/DELETE-Scope getrennt), Credential-Modell
(RQ/Hermes NO SAVE/DELETE; C5C Writer SAVE only; DeleteExecutor DELETE only),
FAIL-CLOSED-Regeln, Human-DELETE-Gate (2 unabhaengige Ebenen AUTH+APPROVAL),
Logging/Secret-Regeln, Rotation/Revocation, Path-Safety-Contract (Defense-in-Depth).
- Isolierte Test-Suite (47 Tests): T1-T20 Auth-Matrix, Human-Approval-Composition A-G,
Adversarial, Sensitivitaet (Mutationen -> ROT). KEIN Produktionscode geaendert.
- KEINE produktive Mutation, KEINE echten Tokens, nur synthetische Fixture-Werte.
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2026-08-27 05:57:22 +00:00 |
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