Red Queen
9c8d239ae5
- approval_payload: kanonischer, deterministischer Approval-Payload - approval_signature: Ed25519 sign/verify (Christian=Private Key, Executor=Public Key only) - approval_verifier: verify-only, alle Bindings fail-closed - approval_state: Lifecycle CREATED->CONSUMED, Single-Use, Reservation, OUTCOME_UNKNOWN - test_approval_auth3d: T1-T30 + adversarial (50 Tests) - test_approval_helpers: synthetische Test-Keypairs - sensitivity_proof: Mutationen A-J machen Tests ROT Nur synthetische Test-Keypairs. Kein produktives Deployment. DELETE_OPERATION_ACTIVATION bleibt BLOCKED bis AUTH.3D geprueft.
232 lines
8.6 KiB
Python
232 lines
8.6 KiB
Python
"""
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AUTH.3D — approval_verifier.py
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Verification-Logik für Human DELETE Approvals (alle §8-Checks).
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Der DELETE Executor MUSS VOR DELETE alle Checks bestehen, sonst DELETE_DENIED.
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FAIL CLOSED: jede Abweichung -> DELETE_DENIED. KEIN Tolaria HTTP DELETE.
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"""
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from __future__ import annotations
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import datetime
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from typing import Any, Dict, List, Optional
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from approval_payload import (
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APPROVAL_VERSION,
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OPERATION_DELETE,
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ApprovalPayloadError,
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canonicalize,
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parse_payload,
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)
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from approval_signature import key_id, verify
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# Reason Codes (FAIL CLOSED)
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RC_SCHEMA_INVALID = "DELETE_DENIED_SCHEMA_INVALID"
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RC_VERSION_UNSUPPORTED = "DELETE_DENIED_VERSION_UNSUPPORTED"
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RC_SIGNATURE_INVALID = "DELETE_DENIED_SIGNATURE_INVALID"
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RC_KEY_REVOKED = "DELETE_DENIED_KEY_REVOKED"
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RC_OPERATION_MISMATCH = "DELETE_DENIED_OPERATION_MISMATCH"
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RC_MISSION_MISMATCH = "DELETE_DENIED_MISSION_MISMATCH"
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RC_REQUEST_MISMATCH = "DELETE_DENIED_REQUEST_MISMATCH"
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RC_OBJECT_MISMATCH = "DELETE_DENIED_OBJECT_MISMATCH"
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RC_PATH_MISMATCH = "DELETE_DENIED_PATH_MISMATCH"
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RC_COMMIT_MISMATCH = "DELETE_DENIED_COMMIT_MISMATCH"
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RC_PROVENANCE_MISMATCH = "DELETE_DENIED_PROVENANCE_MISMATCH"
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RC_NONCE_MISMATCH = "DELETE_DENIED_NONCE_MISMATCH"
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RC_ISSUED_FUTURE = "DELETE_DENIED_ISSUED_FUTURE"
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RC_EXPIRED = "DELETE_DENIED_EXPIRED"
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RC_CONSUMED = "DELETE_DENIED_CONSUMED"
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RC_STATE_DISALLOWED = "DELETE_DENIED_STATE_DISALLOWED"
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RC_REPLAY = "DELETE_DENIED_REPLAY"
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RC_CROSS_OBJECT = "DELETE_DENIED_CROSS_OBJECT"
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RC_CROSS_MISSION = "DELETE_DENIED_CROSS_MISSION"
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RC_KEY_ID_UNKNOWN = "DELETE_DENIED_KEY_ID_UNKNOWN"
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class ApprovalVerificationError(Exception):
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"""Verification fehlgeschlagen (FAIL CLOSED)."""
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def __init__(self, reason_code: str, message: str):
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super().__init__(message)
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self.reason_code = reason_code
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self.message = message
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class ApprovalVerifier:
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"""
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Verifiziert eine Human DELETE Approval gegen den erwarteten Kontext.
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Der Verifier besitzt NUR Public Keys (verify-only). Er kann KEINE
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Approval erzeugen (kein Private Key).
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"""
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def __init__(
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self,
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public_keys: Dict[str, Any],
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revoked_key_ids: Optional[set] = None,
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now_fn=None,
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):
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"""
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public_keys: {key_id: Ed25519PublicKey} — aktuelle + ggf. transitioning Keys.
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revoked_key_ids: set von key_ids, die revoked sind.
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now_fn: optionaler Zeitgeber (Tests); Default datetime.datetime.now(timezone.utc).
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"""
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self.public_keys = dict(public_keys)
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self.revoked_key_ids = set(revoked_key_ids or set())
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self._now_fn = now_fn or (lambda: datetime.datetime.now(datetime.timezone.utc))
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def _now(self) -> datetime.datetime:
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return self._now_fn()
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def verify_approval(
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self,
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raw_payload: str,
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signature: str,
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*,
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expected_mission_id: str,
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expected_delete_request_id: str,
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expected_object_id: str,
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expected_vault_path: str,
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expected_commit: str,
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expected_provenance_hash: str,
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expected_nonce: str,
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consumed: bool = False,
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state_allows_delete: bool = True,
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used_nonces: Optional[set] = None,
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) -> Dict[str, Any]:
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"""
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Führt ALLE §8-Checks aus. Wirft ApprovalVerificationError (DELETE_DENIED)
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bei jedem Fehler. Gibt bei Erfolg ein dict mit Verifikations-Ergebnis zurück.
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"""
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used_nonces = used_nonces or set()
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# 1. Schema gültig (kanonischer Payload)
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try:
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payload = parse_payload(raw_payload)
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except ApprovalPayloadError as e:
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raise ApprovalVerificationError(RC_SCHEMA_INVALID, str(e)) from e
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# 2. Unterstützte Approval-Version
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if payload.get("approval_version") != APPROVAL_VERSION:
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raise ApprovalVerificationError(
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RC_VERSION_UNSUPPORTED,
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f"Unsupported approval_version: {payload.get('approval_version')}",
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)
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# 3. Signatur gültig (Ed25519, Public Key)
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# Zuerst KEY_ID aus dem Payload ableiten? Nein — KEY_ID wird separat übergeben.
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# Wir prüfen gegen ALLE bekannten (nicht-revoked) Public Keys.
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sig_valid = False
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matched_key_id = None
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for kid, pub in self.public_keys.items():
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if kid in self.revoked_key_ids:
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continue
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if verify(pub, payload, signature):
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sig_valid = True
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matched_key_id = kid
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break
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if not sig_valid:
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raise ApprovalVerificationError(RC_SIGNATURE_INVALID, "Signatur ungültig oder Key unbekannt/revoked")
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# 4. Key nicht revoked (bereits in Schleife geprüft)
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# 5. Operation == DELETE
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if payload.get("operation") != OPERATION_DELETE:
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raise ApprovalVerificationError(
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RC_OPERATION_MISMATCH,
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f"operation muss {OPERATION_DELETE} sein, nicht {payload.get('operation')}",
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)
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# 6. Mission stimmt
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if payload.get("mission_id") != expected_mission_id:
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raise ApprovalVerificationError(
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RC_MISSION_MISMATCH,
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f"mission_id {payload.get('mission_id')} != erwartet {expected_mission_id}",
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)
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# 7. Delete Request stimmt
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if payload.get("delete_request_id") != expected_delete_request_id:
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raise ApprovalVerificationError(
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RC_REQUEST_MISMATCH,
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f"delete_request_id {payload.get('delete_request_id')} != erwartet {expected_delete_request_id}",
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)
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# 8. Object stimmt
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if payload.get("object_id") != expected_object_id:
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raise ApprovalVerificationError(
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RC_OBJECT_MISMATCH,
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f"object_id {payload.get('object_id')} != erwartet {expected_object_id}",
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)
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# 9. Path stimmt
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if payload.get("vault_path") != expected_vault_path:
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raise ApprovalVerificationError(
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RC_PATH_MISMATCH,
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f"vault_path {payload.get('vault_path')} != erwartet {expected_vault_path}",
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)
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# 10. Commit stimmt
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if payload.get("expected_commit") != expected_commit:
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raise ApprovalVerificationError(
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RC_COMMIT_MISMATCH,
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f"expected_commit {payload.get('expected_commit')} != erwartet {expected_commit}",
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)
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# 11. Provenance stimmt
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if payload.get("expected_provenance_hash") != expected_provenance_hash:
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raise ApprovalVerificationError(
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RC_PROVENANCE_MISMATCH,
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f"expected_provenance_hash {payload.get('expected_provenance_hash')} != erwartet {expected_provenance_hash}",
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)
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# 12. Nonce stimmt
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if payload.get("nonce") != expected_nonce:
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raise ApprovalVerificationError(
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RC_NONCE_MISMATCH,
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f"nonce {payload.get('nonce')} != erwartet {expected_nonce}",
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)
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# 13. issued_at plausibel (nicht in der Zukunft)
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issued = _parse_iso(payload["issued_at"])
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if issued > self._now() + datetime.timedelta(minutes=5):
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raise ApprovalVerificationError(RC_ISSUED_FUTURE, "issued_at liegt in der Zukunft")
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# 14. expires_at nicht überschritten
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expires = _parse_iso(payload["expires_at"])
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if expires < self._now():
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raise ApprovalVerificationError(RC_EXPIRED, "Approval ist abgelaufen")
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# 15. Approval noch nicht consumed
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if consumed:
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raise ApprovalVerificationError(RC_CONSUMED, "Approval ist bereits consumed")
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# 16. State erlaubt Delete
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if not state_allows_delete:
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raise ApprovalVerificationError(RC_STATE_DISALLOWED, "State erlaubt kein Delete")
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# 17. kein Replay (Nonce bereits verwendet)
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if payload["nonce"] in used_nonces:
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raise ApprovalVerificationError(RC_REPLAY, "Nonce wurde bereits verwendet (Replay)")
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# 18. kein Cross-Object-Reuse (Object-Binding bereits geprüft)
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# 19. kein Cross-Mission-Reuse (Mission-Binding bereits geprüft)
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return {
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"verified": True,
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"key_id": matched_key_id,
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"approval_id": payload["approval_id"],
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"nonce": payload["nonce"],
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"payload_hash": _payload_hash(payload),
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}
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def _parse_iso(value: str) -> datetime.datetime:
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"""Parst ISO-8601-UTC (…Z) zu datetime (UTC)."""
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# Format: YYYY-MM-DDTHH:MM:SSZ
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dt = datetime.datetime.strptime(value, "%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%SZ")
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return dt.replace(tzinfo=datetime.timezone.utc)
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def _payload_hash(payload: Dict[str, Any]) -> str:
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from approval_payload import payload_hash
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return payload_hash(payload)
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