Red Queen 10761f52b2 AUTH.3E: Executor Command Channel + Runtime Boundary Contract ... - job_schema: geschlossene Job-Type-Allowlist (C5_SAVE_OBJECT/C5_DELETE_OBJECT), Pfad-/Längen-Validierung - job_state_machine: deterministische States (CREATED/READY/CLAIMED/EXECUTING/SUCCEEDED/FAILED) - job_claim: atomare Claim-/Lease-/Recovery-Logik (kein TOCTOU) - job_store: getrennte SQLite-Inbox-DBs (c5a_save.db/c5a_delete.db), delegiert an job_claim - save_executor_core: SAVE-only, Content-Rekonstruktion, Provenance-Validierung - delete_executor_core: DELETE-only, AUTH.3D-Composition, TOCTOU-Defense (Re-Read nach Claim) - test_job_channel: T1-T40 + adversarial (72 Tests) - test_job_channel_adversarial: adversarial + Substitution + DB-Manipulation - sensitivity_proof_auth3e: Mutationen A-L (12/12 Invarianten PRESENT) - AUTH3B/3C/3D/3E_DESIGN: autoritative Security-Dokumentation (e25 Reconciliation) COMMAND != AUTHORIZATION. Kein generischer Dispatcher. RQ credential-free. Keine produktive Mutation. Keine echten Credentials.		2026-08-27 10:03:32 +00:00
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AUTH3A_HUMAN_APPROVAL_AUTHENTICITY_GAP.md	AUTH.3A: C5 Caller Auth Integration (SAVE/DELETE Credential, fail-closed, Tests, Sensitivity, Gap-Doku)	2026-08-27 08:42:26 +00:00
AUTH3B_DESIGN.md	AUTH.3E: Executor Command Channel + Runtime Boundary Contract	2026-08-27 10:03:32 +00:00
AUTH3C_DESIGN.md	AUTH.3E: Executor Command Channel + Runtime Boundary Contract	2026-08-27 10:03:32 +00:00
AUTH3D_DESIGN.md	AUTH.3E: Executor Command Channel + Runtime Boundary Contract	2026-08-27 10:03:32 +00:00
AUTH3E_DESIGN.md	AUTH.3E: Executor Command Channel + Runtime Boundary Contract	2026-08-27 10:03:32 +00:00
PRE_HERMES_TOLARIA_WRITE_AUTH_CONTRACT.md	PRE_HERMES_SECURITY_GATE AUTH.1: Tolaria Write Auth Contract + isolierte Test-Suite	2026-08-27 05:57:22 +00:00
test_tolaria_write_auth.py	PRE_HERMES_SECURITY_GATE AUTH.1: Tolaria Write Auth Contract + isolierte Test-Suite	2026-08-27 05:57:22 +00:00