- delete_worker.py: DELETE-scoped worker loop (ApprovalStateStore, fail-closed) - delete_tolaria_client.py: DELETE-only Tolaria client (fixed /delete endpoint) - delete_entrypoint.py: DELETE runtime entrypoint (health/status + worker) - delete_Dockerfile: DELETE executor image (no SAVE code, no credentials) - delete_executor_core.py: minimal SoT patch — VALID_NONCE replay guard + VALID_DELETE_REQUEST binding (approval binds delete_request_id, fail-closed APPROVAL_MISMATCH). Closes P10/T29 security gap in productive SoT. AUTH.4D P14. No deployment, no token injection, no key provisioning.
225 lines
9 KiB
Python
225 lines
9 KiB
Python
"""
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AUTH.4D — worker.py (DELETE-scoped)
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===================================
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DELETE-Worker-Loop für den c5-delete-executor.
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Ablauf (pro Job):
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poll -> atomic claim -> validate -> load approval -> verify AUTH.3D
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signature (Ed25519 PUBLIC KEY ONLY) -> check expiry/nonce/single-use ->
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check object/path/commit/provenance/mission binding -> execute Tolaria
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DELETE on FIXED endpoint -> verify/audit -> complete
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Eigenschaften:
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* DELETE-only: claimt NUR C5_DELETE_OBJECT-Jobs.
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* Der DELETE-Job selbst ist KEINE Approval. Job allein autorisiert NIE.
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* Kein SAVE. Keine write()-Capability. Kein generic dispatcher.
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* Kein shell/python/arbitrary URL/method/headers.
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* POLL_INTERVAL, LEASE, MAX_ATTEMPTS, structured backoff, graceful SIGTERM.
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* OUTCOME_UNKNOWN bei unklarem Delete-Ergebnis. KEIN blinder Retry.
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* Fail-closed: ohne DELETE-Credential wird kein HTTP-DELETE ausgeführt.
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"""
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from __future__ import annotations
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import logging
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import os
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import signal
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import sys
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import time
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from typing import Any, Dict, Optional
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from approval_payload import parse_payload
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from approval_signature import public_key_from_pem
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from approval_state import ApprovalStateStore
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from approval_verifier import ApprovalVerifier, ApprovalVerificationError
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from delete_executor_core import DeleteExecutorCore
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from job_store import JobStore
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from delete_tolaria_client import TolariaClient
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SCOPE = "DELETE"
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DB_PATH = os.environ.get("C5_DELETE_DB", "/data/c5a_delete.db")
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VERSION = "0.1.0-auth4d-wired"
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# Konfiguration (ENV mit konservativen Defaults)
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POLL_INTERVAL = float(os.environ.get("C5_POLL_INTERVAL", "5.0"))
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LEASE_SECONDS = int(os.environ.get("C5_LEASE_SECONDS", "60"))
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MAX_ATTEMPTS = int(os.environ.get("C5_MAX_ATTEMPTS", "3"))
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BACKOFF_BASE = float(os.environ.get("C5_BACKOFF_BASE", "2.0"))
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BACKOFF_MAX = float(os.environ.get("C5_BACKOFF_MAX", "60.0"))
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# Tolaria-Client (fixed base URL, DELETE-only)
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TOLARIA_BASE = os.environ.get("C5_TOLARIA_BASE", "http://tolaria:5173/api/vault")
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TOLARIA_DELETE_TOKEN = os.environ.get("TOLARIA_DELETE_TOKEN")
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# AUTH.3D Public Key (verify-only). NIE ein Private Key.
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# Produktiv: PEM des Christian Public Key (Human-Gate-Phase). Fehlt -> fail-closed.
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PUBLIC_VERIFY_KEY_PEM = os.environ.get("C5_DELETE_PUBLIC_KEY_PEM")
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logging.basicConfig(
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level=logging.INFO,
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format="%(asctime)s %(levelname)s %(name)s: %(message)s",
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)
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log = logging.getLogger("c5-delete-worker")
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# Graceful Shutdown
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_shutdown = False
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def _handle_sigterm(signum, frame):
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global _shutdown
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log.info("SIGTERM empfangen — Worker fährt sauber herunter.")
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_shutdown = True
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def _handle_sigint(signum, frame):
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global _shutdown
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log.info("SIGINT empfangen — Worker fährt sauber herunter.")
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_shutdown = True
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signal.signal(signal.SIGTERM, _handle_sigterm)
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signal.signal(signal.SIGINT, _handle_sigint)
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def _backoff_delay(attempt: int) -> float:
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"""Structured exponential backoff (kein blinder Retry, nur transient)."""
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delay = min(BACKOFF_MAX, BACKOFF_BASE * (2 ** (attempt - 1)))
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return delay
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def _build_verifier() -> Optional[ApprovalVerifier]:
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"""Baut den AUTH.3D-Verifier aus dem Public Key (verify-only).
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Fehlender/ungültiger Public Key -> None (fail-closed: keine Approval
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kann verifiziert werden, kein DELETE wird ausgeführt).
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"""
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if not PUBLIC_VERIFY_KEY_PEM or not PUBLIC_VERIFY_KEY_PEM.strip():
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return None
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try:
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pub = public_key_from_pem(PUBLIC_VERIFY_KEY_PEM.encode("utf-8"))
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except Exception as e:
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log.error("Ungültiger Public Key PEM: %s", e)
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return None
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from approval_signature import key_id
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return ApprovalVerifier(public_keys={key_id(pub): pub})
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def _build_worker() -> tuple[JobStore, DeleteExecutorCore]:
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"""Baut Store + Core mit injizierten Callables (Verdrahtung)."""
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store = JobStore(DB_PATH, SCOPE)
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client = TolariaClient(base_url=TOLARIA_BASE, delete_token=TOLARIA_DELETE_TOKEN)
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verifier = _build_verifier()
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# AUTH.3D Approval-State-Store (Single-Use / Nonce / Reservation).
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# In Produktion: C5-DB (delete_approvals). Hier: In-Memory (isoliert).
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approval_store = ApprovalStateStore()
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def approval_loader(approval_id: str) -> Optional[Dict[str, Any]]:
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# Approval wird aus dem Approval-State-Store geladen (approval_id).
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# Kein externer Approval-Service, keine Approval im Job-Payload.
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return approval_store.get(approval_id)
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def approval_verify(approval: Dict[str, Any]) -> Dict[str, Any]:
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# AUTH.3D-Verifikation (Ed25519 PUBLIC KEY ONLY).
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# Fail-closed: kein Verifier / kein Public Key -> DELETE_DENIED.
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if verifier is None:
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return {"valid": False, "code": "DELETE_DENIED", "reason": "no public key"}
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try:
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result = verifier.verify_approval(
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approval["raw_payload"],
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approval["signature"],
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expected_mission_id=approval["mission_id"],
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expected_delete_request_id=approval["delete_request_id"],
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expected_object_id=approval["object_id"],
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expected_vault_path=approval["vault_path"],
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expected_commit=approval["expected_commit"],
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expected_provenance_hash=approval["expected_provenance_hash"],
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expected_nonce=approval["nonce"],
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consumed=approval.get("consumed", False),
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state_allows_delete=approval.get("state_allows_delete", True),
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used_nonces=approval.get("used_nonces", set()),
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)
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return {"valid": True, "reason": "ok", "key_id": result.get("key_id")}
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except ApprovalVerificationError as e:
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return {"valid": False, "code": e.reason_code, "reason": e.message}
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except Exception as e:
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return {"valid": False, "code": "DELETE_DENIED", "reason": str(e)}
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def tolaria_delete(vault_path: str) -> Dict[str, Any]:
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try:
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client.delete(vault_path)
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return {"status": "ok"}
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except Exception as e:
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# Unklar vs. bestätigt unterscheiden
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code = getattr(e, "code", "TOLARIA_UNAVAILABLE")
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if code == "CREDENTIAL_MISSING":
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return {"status": "error", "code": "CREDENTIAL_MISSING", "uncertain": False}
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if code in ("AUTH_FAILURE", "INVALID_SCHEMA"):
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return {"status": "error", "code": code, "uncertain": False}
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# Netzwerk/Timeout/5xx -> unklar (kein blinder Retry)
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return {"status": "error", "code": "TOLARIA_UNAVAILABLE", "uncertain": True}
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core = DeleteExecutorCore(store, approval_loader, approval_verify, tolaria_delete)
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return store, core
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def _process_ready_job(store: JobStore, core: DeleteExecutorCore, job: Dict[str, Any]) -> None:
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"""Verarbeitet einen READY-Job (mit MAX_ATTEMPTS + backoff)."""
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job_id = job["job_id"]
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attempt = 0
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while attempt < MAX_ATTEMPTS:
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attempt += 1
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log.info("Verarbeite Job %s (Versuch %d/%d)", job_id, attempt, MAX_ATTEMPTS)
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try:
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result = core.process_job(job_id, f"worker-{os.getpid()}")
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state = result.get("state")
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log.info("Job %s -> %s (result_code=%s)",
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job_id, state, result.get("result_code"))
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# Terminal-States: fertig. OUTCOME_UNKNOWN: kein blinder Retry.
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if state in ("SUCCEEDED", "FAILED", "REJECTED", "OUTCOME_UNKNOWN"):
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return
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# READY/CLAIMED/EXECUTING (transient) -> backoff + erneut versuchen
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if attempt < MAX_ATTEMPTS:
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time.sleep(_backoff_delay(attempt))
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except Exception as e:
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log.error("Job %s Fehler: %s", job_id, e)
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if attempt < MAX_ATTEMPTS:
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time.sleep(_backoff_delay(attempt))
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# MAX_ATTEMPTS erschöpft -> OUTCOME_UNKNOWN (kein blinder Retry)
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try:
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store.mark_outcome_unknown(job_id, f"worker-{os.getpid()}")
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except Exception:
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pass
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def main() -> int:
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log.info("c5-delete-worker v%s startet (scope=%s, poll=%.1fs, lease=%ds, max_attempts=%d)",
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VERSION, SCOPE, POLL_INTERVAL, LEASE_SECONDS, MAX_ATTEMPTS)
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if not TOLARIA_DELETE_TOKEN:
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log.warning("TOLARIA_DELETE_TOKEN fehlt — fail-closed: kein HTTP-DELETE wird ausgeführt.")
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if not PUBLIC_VERIFY_KEY_PEM:
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log.warning("C5_DELETE_PUBLIC_KEY_PEM fehlt — fail-closed: keine Approval kann verifiziert werden.")
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store, core = _build_worker()
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try:
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while not _shutdown:
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try:
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# READY-Jobs claimen und verarbeiten
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ready_jobs = store.list_jobs(state="READY")
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for job in ready_jobs:
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if _shutdown:
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break
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_process_ready_job(store, core, job)
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except Exception as e:
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log.error("Worker-Loop-Fehler: %s", e)
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# Poll-Intervall (graceful: bei SIGTERM sofort raus)
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for _ in range(int(POLL_INTERVAL * 10)):
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if _shutdown:
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break
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time.sleep(0.1)
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finally:
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store.close()
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log.info("Worker beendet.")
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return 0
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if __name__ == "__main__":
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sys.exit(main())
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